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Friedman: The Good Faith Defense in Constitutional Litigation

DEVELOPMENTS

IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW

THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSE IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION
Leon Friedman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Suits against government officials have increased enormously in recent years. In fiscal year 1960 the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts reported 247 civil rights cases'
filed in federal district courts.2 By fiscal year 1970 there were
3,985 such suits, an increase of 1,614%,' and by fiscal year 1976,
the figure had grown to 12,329, an increase of 4,991% over 1960.1
These figures include both civil rights suits against state officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 19835 and actions against federal officials for
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; A.B., Harvard College; LL.B., Harvard University. The author was one of the attorneys representing Morton
H. Halperin in Halperin v. Kissinger, 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976), discussed in this
article.
1. Civil rights suits are divided into five separate categories by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts: Voting, Jobs, Accommodations, Welfare, and Other
Civil Rights. These categories correspond to suits brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
through 1985, suits under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (employment discrimination), and
suits under Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (public accommodations). Included also are suits
against federal officers for injunctions or damages for constitutional torts. See text accompanying notes 46-50 infra. In fiscal year 1976, a total of 1,276 cases out of 12,329 filed
involved a federal official as defendant. See 1976 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

Table C-2, 1-14 [hereinafter cited

as 1976 ANNUAL REPORT]. Some of these cases involved suits against private individuals
brought under §§ 1981, 1982, Title VII and Title I. It is impossible to determine precisely
how many of the civil rights cases involved only suits against state or federal officials. A
computer printout supplied to the author on December 29, 1976, of all the civil rights cases
filed in fiscal year 1976 indicates that the great majority of the cases involved voting,
welfare, and "other civil rights" issues which would generally involve government officials.
Many employment discrimination cases also involve government agencies as employers.
As indicated in this article, the great majority of reported cases brought for violations of
civil rights involve § 1983 cases against state officials or suits against federal officials for
constitutional violations.

2. 1970

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS

109 [hereinafter cited as 1970 ANNUAL REPORT].
3. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 109.
4. 1976 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, Table 16, at 78.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971) provides:
Civil action for deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory subjects or causes to be subjected, any
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constitutional torts after the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens

v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.6 The Administrative Office further reports that an
additional 7,460 civil rights suits were brought by prisoners
against state and federal prison officials. The total of 19,789 cases
was the largest category of civil litigation in the federal district
courts, comprising 15% of the total filings in 1976. 7
These suits involve claims against almost every type of government official, from the President of the United States,' the
Attorney General,9 high White House and FBI officials,'" and
Cabinet Officers," to sheriffs, 12 police officers, 3 school adminis-

17
trators,1 4 IRS agents,1 5 hospital superintendents," governors,

state military officials, 18 building inspectors, 9 and prison officials.20
A wide variety of official actions form the basis of such law
suits: wrongful death claims, 2 1 assaults,2 1 illegal searches,2 illegal
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity
or other proper proceeding for redress.
6. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
7. 1976 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, Table C-2, 1-14-15.

8. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976).
9. Id. See also Hallinan v. Mitchell, 418 F. Supp. 1056 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
10. Among other defendants in the Halperincase were National Security Advisor and
later Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Presidential Assistants H. R. Haldeman and
John Ehrlichman, and Assistant Director of the FBI William C. Sullivan.
11. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Secretary of Agriculture), cert. grantedsub nom. Bhtz v. Economou, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
12. Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976).
13. Boscarino v. Nelson, 518 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1975); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d
1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
14. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214
(N.D. I1. 1976).
15. White v. Boyle, 938 F.2d 1077 (4th Cir. 1976).
16. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
17. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461 (1st Cir.
1975).
18. Chaudoin v. Atkinson, 406 F. Supp. 32 (D. Del. 1975).
19. Laverne v. Coming, 522 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. Mukmuk v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Correctional Servs., 529 F.2d 272 (2d
Cir. 1976).
21. Haber v. County of Nassau, 418 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
22. Rendl v. Rizzo, 418 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
23. Warner v. Croft, 406 F. Supp. 717 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
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arrests24 or break-ins, 5 inadequate medical attention,26 tax investigations, 27 illegal wiretapsM and a range of improper actions by
school administrators.29
Any one of several factors may be responsible for this outburst of civil rights activity: Victim groups have developed a
greater awareness of their legal rights and a willingness to assert
them; new legal rules such as those which emerged from the
Bivens3l decision have provided a rationale for such suits; and
congressional committees, such as the Ervin and Church committees, 3' and investigative reporters have provided solid evidence on which to base such suits. 3 2 Regardless of the cause,

federal courts have now had to cope with difficult legal questions
to determine the extent to which state and federal officers at
every level must answer by paying money damages for complaints
about their official actions.
II.

THE RETREAT FROM ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

The existing legal standards were largely inadequate to deal
with the multiplicity of claims being brought against all levels of
government officials. While difficult problems have arisen regarding the nature of the constitutional right asserted,33 the standing
of the plaintiff, 34 the extent of his injury,3M or the liability of the
governmental entity involved,3" perhaps the most crucial question
24. Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
25. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
917 (1974).
26. Kellerman v. Askew, 541 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1976).
27. White v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077 (4th Cir. 1976).
28. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
29. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); McCormack v. Attala Bd. of
Educ., 541 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.
1976).
30. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
31. SELECT Comm. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 93-981, 93d

Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);

SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACrIvITIEs, S. REP. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).

32. Lake v. Ehrlichman, No. 74-887 (D.D.C. 1974), was filed as a result of various
newspaper stories concerning the Kissinger tapes. Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 953
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), resulted from an article appearing on February 25, 1974, in the New York
Times at page 52, describing how the FBI supplied secret material in its files to Congressman John Rooney in his campaign against Allard K. Lowenstein.
33. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
34. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
35. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
36. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d
70, 73 (2d Cir. 1975). Whether a government entity is entitled to the same kind of good
faith defense as a government official is discussed in Owen v. City of Independence, Mo.,
421 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
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has been the scope of immunity for the officials whose actions are
under attack.
The Supreme Court held in 1959 in Barr v. Matteol that
federal officials of subcabinet rank were absolutely immune from
libel or slander liability for statements made within their line of
duty. In Barr the plaintiffs, subordinate officials in the Office of
Rent Stabilization, sued the Acting Director for libel because of
a press release he had issued announcing his intention to suspend
the plaintiffs for their participation in formulating a certain plan
for the use of agency funds. The jury found for the plaintiffs and
the judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals. The Supreme
Court reversed. Quoting from an earlier decision in Spalding v.
Vilas,38 which involved a libel suit against the Postmaster General, the Court noted:
In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive
Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should
not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his
official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry
in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper
and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the
executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any
such restraint.39
The Court further stated:
It has been thought important that officials of government
should be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear
of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of those
duties - suits which would consume time and energies which
would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the
threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous,
and effective administration of policies of government."
It concluded:
We think that under these circumstances a publicly expressed
statement of the position of the agency head.

. .

was an appro-

priate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank
must possess if the public service is to function effectively. . ..
The fact that the action here taken was within the outer
37.
38.
39.
40.

360
161
360
360

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

564 (1959).
483 (1896).
564, 570 (1959) (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896)).
564, 571 (1959).
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perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the
privilege applicable .... 1,
Barr v. Matteo has been cited as establishing the doctrine of
absolute immunity for "discretionary acts" by executive department officials. The doctrine was explained by Professor Louis
Jaffe some years ago:
[I]f the officer acts in an area where customarily he has discretion - that is, has a power and duty to make a choice among
valid alternatives - he is not held liable in damages even
though in the case at hand he made a choice that was beyond
his power, or indeed had no valid choice open to him at all.4"
The doctrine was invoked in 1972 by the Second Circuit when the
Bivens case was remanded to it.13 The Second Circuit's approach
to the problem requires that a court first determine whether an
official is acting within the "outer perimeter" of his or her line of
duty and then decide whether the acts complained of were discretionary or not. Once it has been established that the officers were
acting within the scope of their authority, in order to be immune
they must show that they perform "'discretionary acts at those
levels of government where the concept of duty encompasses the
sound exercise of discretionary authority.' ")44
There are a number of difficulties with the doctrine, however.
First, there is some discretion attached to almost every
governmental function. Thus the crucial concept in the doctrine
becomes impossible to define. As the Second Circuit said:
45
"[W]ords such as 'discretion' are not particularly helpful."
Secondly, liability has attached to a wide range of activities of
government officials who perform more than mere ministerial
acts. Professor Jaffe explains:
[TIhere are areas, notably actions against police officers for
false arrest, battery, and trespass, and actions for summary destruction of property and improper collection of taxes, where
recovery has long been allowed, despite the exercise by the officer of more than a "merely ministerial" function. This is partic41. Id. at 574-75.
42. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HAV. L.
REv. 209, 218 (1963).

43. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
44. Id. at 1342-43 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 565, 575 (1959)).
45. Id. at 1345.
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ularly clear in the case of police officers, who are called upon to
make extremely difficult factual choices, and important, if unarticulated, policy decisions . . .
Thus the use of the "discretionary" concept is misleading and
often states rather than explains the result.
In recent years the Barrv. Matteo principle has played a very
limited role in determining the scope of immunity for executive
department officials. There are a number of reasons behind this
development. Again, there are serious definitional and intellectual problems with the notion of "discretionary acts."47 Additionally, the Supreme Court never fully adopted the reasoning of the
Barr decision. Only four Justices joined in the opinion of the
Court which declared federal officials absolutely immune. Justice
Black concurred in the judgment only because he concluded that
the statements complained of were "related more or less to general matters committed by law to [the defendant's] control and
supervision.""8 Justice Black concluded that on the undisputed
facts the defendant proved he was entitled to a qualified privilege
since he was acting within the scope of his duties in issuing the
statement in question, and his right to criticize other government
employees was protected by the first amendment. 9 Four other
Justices dissented and would have affirmed the judgment for the
plaintiff.
In addition, Barr v. Matteo involved a cause of action for
libel and slander which was not a constitutional violation." In
balancing the need for effective functioning of government
against the assertion of a common law tort claim, a court might
well conclude that the latter interest has to yield. But federal
courts are bound to enforce the Constitution and to protect a
citizen's constitutional rights against all those who would violate
them, including government officials at every level. As a district
court recently noted: "[A]lthough an executive official may be
absolutely immune when monetary relief is sought in an ordinary
tort action, courts must apply a different standard to a claim
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Jaffe, supra note 42, at 218-19.
See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1959)(Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 577.
In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Supreme Court held that defamation

actions do not rise to the level of a violation of a constitutional right. See also Expeditions
Unlinlited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., No. 74-1899 (D.C. Cir. June 28,
1976).
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brought under the Civil Rights Act for the deprivation of a constitutional right. ' 51 Many claims against government officials may
involve an overlap of common law tort claims and constitutional
violations. For example, if a police officer uses excessive force
against a person, the victim may sue for assault and for violation
of section 1983,52 or if a police officer participates in an illegal
break-in, the officer's conduct may constitute a trespass as well
as a fourth amendment violation.13 In that situation the constitutional standard must apply. 4 It is a rare case in which a government official is sued solely for a common law tort. Thus Barr v.
Matteo has a limited role to play in the many cases brought under
the civil rights acts.
In 1973 in the case of Doe v. McMillan55 the Supreme Court
had occasion to reexamine the scope of immunity for federal officials. In that case the plaintiffs brought an action against several
members of Congress, members of their staffs and the Superintendent of Documents and the Public Printer because of the attempted publication of a special report which discussed, in part,
the disciplinary problems of specifically named students in the
District of Columbia school system. The Supreme Court upheld
51. Fralkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 954 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See also Donaldson
v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 530 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422 U.S. 563
(1975): "We have consistently held that the range of officials [sic] immunity available
at common law do not apply in actions brought under § 1983."
52. Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
53. Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1973).
54. See Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1973); Carter v.
Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for
Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MINN.L. REv. 991 (1975). See alsio Sportique
Fashions, Inc. v. Sullivan, 421 F. Supp. 302, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Conversely, if the
common law tort requires a particular mental component (i.e., improper motive) that
requirement will generally be read into and become an element of the § 1983 cause of
action. See Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309, 1315 (2d Cir. 1974); Williams v. Gould, 486
F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1973).
Some conduct may be actionable as a tort in state courts but may not rise to a
violation of § 1983. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (libel); Gittlemacker v. Prasse,
428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970)(improper and negligent medical attention). The converse is also
true. Some conduct may be actionable in federal court as a § 1983 violation or a constitutional tort even if there is no comparable state law violation. See Strickland v. Inlow, 519
F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1975), on remand from Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)(procedural due process violation); Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii
1973)(first amendment violation). If the two causes of action overlap, however, the same
mental component (whether malice, wilfullness or negligence) will generally be required
for both. See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other groundssub
nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d
1228 (4th Cir. 1970). But see Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976).
55. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
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the absolute immunity of the legislators involved but, contrary to
Barr v. Matteo, it did not grant blanket immunity to the Superintendent of Documents and the Public Printer even though they
were high executive department officials sued for invasion of privacy, a tort akin to libel and slander. In its decision the Court
explained the limitations of its Barr ruling as follows:
In the Barr case, the Court reaffirmed existing immunity
law but made it clear that the immunity conferred might not be
the same for all officials for all purposes. .

. Judges, like exec-

utive officers with discretionary functions, have been held absolutely immune regardless of their motive or good faith ....
But policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more limited
privilege. .

.

. Also, the Court determined in Barr that the

scope of immunity from defamation suits should be determined
by the relation of the publication complained of to the duties
entrusted to the officer ...
Because the Court has not fashioned a fixed, invariable rule
of immunity but has advised a discerning inquiry into whether
the contributions of immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the perhaps recurring harm to individual
citizens, there is no ready-made answer as to whether the remaining federal respondents - the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents - should be accorded absolute
immunity in this case." 6
After considering the functions of the Superintendent of Documents and the Public Printer, the Court concluded:
[Flor the purposes of the judicially fashioned doctrine of immunity, the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents are no more free from suit in the case before us than
would be a legislative aide who made copies of the materials at
issue and distributed them to the public at the direction of his
superiors. .

.

. The scope of inquiry becomes equivalent to the

inquiry in the context of the Speech or Debate Clause, and the
answer is the same. The business of Congress is to legislate;
Congressmen and aides are absolutely immune when they are
legislating. But when they act outside the "sphere of legitimate
legislative activity" . . . they enjoy no special immunity from

local laws protecting the good name or the reputation of the
ordinary citizen.57
56. Id. at 319-20 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 324 (citations omitted).
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Thus, even in an area where Barr v. Matteo seemed precisely on
point the Court avoided a finding of absolute immunity and
opted for a more flexible rule of qualified immunity.
The absolute immunity approach of Barr v. Matteo, then,
has been held to be too inflexible to deal with the great variety
of claims brought against government officials. The Supreme
Court has affirmed absolute immunity only for limited classes of
government officials, such as legislators," prosecutors 9 or
judges, 0 who, because of their special functions, require special
protection. Executive department officials generally, though,
cannot clothe themselves with absolute protection against civil
damage suits.
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Doe v. McMillan"' and Scheuer v. Rhodes,"2 the lower federal courts began
to reject any notions of absolute immunity. Whereas in 1964
the Fifth Circuit in Norton v. McShane' 3 had declared that
even federal marshalls (i.e., low level officials) were absolutely
immune if they were acting within the outer perimeter of their
line of duty, and in 1967 the Seventh Circuit in Scherer v.
Brennan 4 made a similar finding, the approach changed in the
1970's. The District of Columbia Circuit, for example, held in
Apton v. Wilson, 5 a 1974 case, that even high-level officials of the
Justice Department, including the Attorney General and his
immediate deputies, enjoyed only a qualified immunity when
charged with arranging mass arrests and illegal confinement during the Mayday Demonstration in Washington in May 1971.6
The Fifth Circuit in Donaldson v. O'Connor 7 held that any
58. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
59. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). However, prosecutors are liable for
damages arising out of actions not related to their prosecutorial functions such as arranging for mass arrests. Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also Walker v.
Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976); Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1976)
(issuing press releases).
60. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 319 (1973).
61. Id. at 306.
62. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See text accompanying notes 72-78 infra.
63. 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
64. 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967) (secret service agents).
65. 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
66. Id. at 93.
67. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,422 U.S. 563 (1975). See
text accompanying note 80 infra. See also Sportique Fashions, Inc. v. Sullivan, 421 F.
Supp. 302 (N.D. Cal. 1976): "[1It now appears to be the law that claims of violations of
constitutional or civil rights fail under the 'good faith' test of Scheuer, while Barr applies
to no more than actions for common-law torts." Id. at 306.
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notion of absolute immunity for discretionary acts was inconsistent with the purpose of the civil rights acts:
Official immunity has been restricted under § 1983, because that provision is directed at actions "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or
Territory", and provides that "every person" subjecting another
to a deprivation of constitutional rights shall be liable. . . . It
has been the view of the courts that recognizing broad judicial
immunities "would practically constitute a judicial repeal" of §
1983, since state officers are likely to be the primary persons
found acting "under color of" law."
Instead of applying the "'discretionary act test' for determining
when official immunity is appropriate in § 1983 cases,"" the Fifth
Circuit applied a good faith test similar to that ultimately
adopted by the Supreme Court: "[W]e . . . have applied . . .
the 'good faith for qualified governmental immunity' test, allowing immunity when (1) the officer's acts were discretionary; and
(2) the officer was acting in good faith."70
III. THE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GOOD

FAITH DEFENSE

A year after the decision in Doe v. McMillan, the Supreme
Court reexamined the immunity test to be applied when government officials are sued for violating a citizen's constitutional
rights. The Court held in Scheuer v. Rhodes" that "government
officials, as a class, could not be totally exempt, by virtue of some
absolute immunity, from liability" under the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983.13 The case involved a suit brought by the survivors
of the four students killed at Kent State by members of the Ohio
National Guard in May 1970. The defendants included the Governor of the State, the Adjutant General, his assistant, and various officers and enlisted members of the Ohio National Guard.
The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that inas68. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 530 (5th Cir. 1974)(citations omitted).
69. Id. See also Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Butz v. Economou, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1977): "We are satisfied that the individual defendants [including the Secretary of Agriculture] do not require and are not entitled to absolute immunity in order to enable them
to perform their duties." Id. at 696.
70. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 530 (1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422
U.S. 563 (1975).
71. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
72. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
73. Id. at 243.
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much as the suit was brought against the State of Ohio it was
barred by the eleventh amendment. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the alternate ground that
the defendants were absolutely immune from suit.74 The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that instead of absolute immunity only
a qualified immunity
is available to officers of the executive branch of government,
the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and
responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they
reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability
is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds
for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive
officers for acts performed in
75
the course of official conduct.

Although Scheuer involved a section 1983 action against
state officials, the approach taken in that case was soon extended
to suits against federal officials for constitutional torts71 or for

violation of other federal statutes such as the wiretap law.7 Thus
the Scheuer case established the basic test to determine the liability of all state and federal executive branch officers when sued
for violating the Constitution.
At the core of the test lies the concept of good faith. The
Court in Scheuer noted the district court's acceptance of the Governor's claim that he had acted in good faith. But in the opinion
of the Supreme Court "[tihere was no evidence from which such
a finding of good faith could be properly made and, in the circumstances of these cases, such a dispositive conclusion could not be
judicially noticed.

'78

The Court, however, did not define the meaning of "good
faith" in the context of a civil rights action. Did "good faith"
mean that the government officials acted without malice or an
evil intent, that they affirmatively believed that they were acting
within the law or the limits of their authority, or that they were
74. 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
75. 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
76. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), on remand from 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 539
F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1976); Mark v. Graff, 521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975); Brubaker v. King,
505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974); Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970). See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
78. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 250 (1974).
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following what they thought were lawful orders of their superiors?
These questions awaited decision.
The next Supreme Court case to examine the problem was
7" In Wood two Arkansas high school students
Wood v. Strickland.
had been expelled for allegedly violating a school board regulation prohibiting the use of intoxicating beverages at school activities. The students had put a malt liquor containing 3.2% alcohol
into the school punch which raised its alcoholic content to 0.91%.
After being expelled, the students sued the members of the school
board and two school administrators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violating their constitutional rights by denying them due process.
The district court ruled that the students could not succeed
in their cause of action unless they could demonstrate that the
school officials had acted with malice, which the court defined as
"ill will against a person - a wrongful act done intentionally
without just cause or excuse.'" The court of appeals considered
the test too restrictive and held that a specific intent to injure the
students was not necessary: "It need only be established that the
defendants did not, in the light of all the circumstances, act in
good faith. The test is an objective, rather than a subjective,
one." 8
The Supreme Court held that the correct test was somewhere
between the formulation of the district court and that of the court
of appeals:
The disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the
District Court over the immunity standard in this case has been
put in terms of an "objective" versus a "subjective" test of good
faith. As we see it, the appropriate standard necessarily contains
elements of both. The official himself must be acting sincerely
and with a belief that he is doing right, but an act violating a
student's constitutional rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law on the part of one
entrusted with supervision of students' daily lives than by the
presence of actual malice.82
The Court held that malice was not the only consideration:
To be entitled to a special exemption from the categorical remedial language of § 1983 in a case in which his action violated a
79. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).

80. Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244, 248 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
81. Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1973).
82. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
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student's constitutional rights, a school board member, who has
voluntarily undertaken the task of supervising the operation of
the school and the activities of the students, must be held to a
standard of conduct based not only on permissible intentions,
but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional
rights of his charges.m
The Court acknowledged that while a malicious intent would
undermine any defense by a government official, another crucial
factor was whether the right infringed had been clearly established by law:
Therefore, in the specific context of school discipline, we hold
that a school board member is not immune from liability for
damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student. That is not to say that school board members are "charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 557. A. compensatory
award will be appropriate only if the school board member has
acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights
that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in
good faith."
The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals with the
instruction that it apply the new subjective/objective test of good
5
faith.8
The next Supreme Court case to discuss the good faith de5 A former patient of a state
fense was O'Connor v. Donaldson."
mental hospital (Donaldson) sued the hospital superintendent
(O'Connor) and other members of the hospital staff under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for intentionally depriving him of his constitutional
right to liberty for fifteen years. Trial testimony demonstrated
83. Id. at 322.

84. Id.
85. On remand, the court of appeals held that the members of the board had violated
the procedural due process rights of the students involved by not giving them adequate
notice of all the charges against them. Thus they were entitled to the equitable relief they
sought (i.e., clearing their records). The case was remanded to the district court for
application of the reasonable good faith test to determine whether damages should be
imposed as well. See Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1975).
86. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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that the patient posed no danger to himself or to others. Furthermore, responsible persons outside the hospital were willing to
provide for him upon his release and one defendant acknowledged
that Donaldson could have earned his own living outside the hospital. A jury returned a verdict of $28,500 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages against the defendants.
O'Connor's principal defense was that he had acted in good
faith and was therefore immune from any liability for monetary
damages. He claimed that state law had authorized indefinite
custodial confinement of the "sick" even if they were not given
treatment and were not potentially harmful to anyone. The trial
judge instructed the jury with respect to the good faith defense
that O'Connor would be immune from damages if he "'reasonably believed in good faith that detention of [Donaldson] was
proper for the length of time he was so confined. . ..

.'"

The trial

court had rejected a proposed instruction by O'Connor as follows:
"'[I]f defendants acted pursuant to a statute which was not
declared unconstitutional at the time, they cannot be held accountable for such action.'-"8 The Supreme Court held that
"[t]he fact that state law may have authorized confinement of
the harmless mentally ill does not itself establish a constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement,""9 but it did not conclude that O'Connor's proposed instruction on good faith was
properly rejected by the trial judge. Rather, it remanded the case
for the lower court to determine whether the rejection of the proposed instruction comported with the new qualified immunity
9 The Court concluded:
test established in Wood v. Strickland.
For purposes of this question, an official has, of course, no duty
to anticipate unforeseeable constitutional developments....
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to enable that court to consider, in
light of Wood v. Strickland,whether the District Judge's failure
to instruct with regard to the effect of O'Connor's claimed reliance on state law rendered inadequate the instructions as to
O'Connor's liability for compensatory and punitive damages."
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 571.
Id. at 570 n.5.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 577. See notes 79-85 supra for a discussion of Wood v. Strickland.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (citations omitted).
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IV.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSE

The decisions of the Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes,9"
Wood v. Strickland,3 and O'Connor v. Donaldson94 have established the broad outlines of the good faith defense in constitutional litigation. Lower federal courts have amplified the holdings
of those cases and it is now possible to lay out the chief features
of the defense.
A. The good faith defense comes into play only when a constitutional violation has occurred.
There is no occasion to apply the good faith defense if there
has been no constitutional violation. That is, if the government
official has acted properly and in conformity with the Constitution, proof that the action was taken in good faith need not be
offered. There may be situations, though, in which proof of bad
faith may itself lead to a finding that a constitutional violation
has occurred. For example, a prosecutor who presses criminal
charges in bad faith under a dormant statute may violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution, 5 but if he prosecutes
a personal enemy for larceny or fraud or any other ordinary crime
he does not have to show that there was no personal malice involved.
If a police officer arrests an individual because he hates that
person, and the arrestee is later indicted for and convicted of the
crime, the animus behind the arrest is irrelevant. If the officer
had probable cause to arrest the individual, he is generally protected from liability for false arrest regardless of his motive 9 unless excessive force is used. 7 It is only when there is a finding that
92. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
93. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
94. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).

95. See United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Steele,
461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1971).
See also United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1974); Murguia v. Municipal
Court, 15 Cal. 3d 286, 540 P.2d 44, 124 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975).
96. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); Burgwin v. Mattson, 522 F.2d 1213 (9th
Cir. 1975); Bezdek v. City of Elmhurst, 70 F.R.D. 636 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Johnson v. City of
New York, 401 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kipps v. Ewell, 391 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D.
Va. 1975).
97. See Russ v. Ratliff, 538 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976); Lynn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855
(8th Cir. 1976); Palmer v. Hall, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d
1228 (4th Cir. 1970); Philips v. Ward, 415 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Fults v. Pearsall,
408 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Tenn. 1975). Cf. Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975).
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probable cause did not exist that the arresting officer's state of
mind becomes relevant. 8
B. Good faith is a defense to a claim for money damages but not
to a request for injunctive or declaratory relief.
This principle is a corollary of the first: If a constitutional
violation has occurred, a court must enjoin its continuance
whether or not the officials involved had a good faith belief in the
legality their actions. The Supreme Court made it clear in
O'Connor v. Donaldson that the lower court finding that plaintiff's constitutional right to liberty had been violated was not to
be disturbed.9 If Donaldson had still been confined, his release
would have been ordered.
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon,' ° a suit
against then President Nixon, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court held that good faith is only a defense to a suit for damages:
"A good faith defense in a suit for damages brought against any
federal official as an individual is seemingly established by Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents.

.

.but that defense is not assertable

in the face of a quest limited to injunctive, declaratory or mandamus relief."''
In a number of cases dealing with unconstitutional prison
conditions, the officials involved did not have to answer in money
damages because they had a good faith belief in the legality of
their actions, but they were enjoined from continuing them.' In
a case involving sick leave benefits for pregnant school teachers,
the Ninth Circuit held (prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert') that the school board had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by not granting such
leaves.1"' Thus, the plaintiff school teacher was entitled to all
equitable remedies provided by the Act, including back pay, costs
and attorneys' fees as well as a declaration that the policy was
98. See Boscarino v. Nelson, 518 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1975); Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d
367 (7th Cir. 1968).
99. 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975).
100. 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
101. Id. at 609 (citations omitted).
102. Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178 (2d Cir. 1971).
103. 45 U.S.L.W. 4031 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976).
104. Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975). See
also McCormick v. Attala County Bd. of Educ., 541 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1976); Demkowicz
v. Endry, 411 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
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illegal. But in view of the unsettled state of the law relating to
the problem, the individual school board members could not be
held liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Similarly, in a
case involving reverse discrimination, a district court held:
It has long been the law that officials, acting in their official
capacities, are subject to injunctive and declaratory relief for
violating constitutional rights. . . .That one or more of the defendants may not have been directly involved in the commission
of the discrimination is no bar; governmental entities and superior officials may be held responsible for the constitutional violations of their subordinates
for the purposes of injunctive and
05
declaratory relief.

C. A finding of subjective bad faith renders unnecessary any
inquiry into the reasonablenessof the official's belief in the
legality of his conduct.
The Supreme Court's decision in Wood v. Strickland established the reasonable good faith test: The "official himself must
be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right,"'' 6 and
that belief must be reasonable. If the defendant does not act in
good faith, it is irrelevant how uncertain the law is with respect
to the right involved. His subjective lack of good faith is enough
to lead to liability." 7
One example of this approach appears in Halperin v.
Kissinger.' In that case a number of high government officials,
including former President Nixon, were sued for installing and
maintaining a warrantless wiretap on the Halperin home tele105. Hupart v. Board of Higher Educ., 420 F. Supp. 1087, 1107-08 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)(citations omitted).

106. 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
107. The Supreme Court seems not to have recognized this point in O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In that case the jury awarded both compensatory and
punitive damages, the latter based on instructions which required an affirmative finding
of malice. Therefore the existence of a statute permitting continued confinement of persons in Donaldson's position should have been irrelevant. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court remanded for a reexamination of the defendant's proposed instructions relating to
his reliance on state law. Subsequently the case was settled with the payment of damages
to O'Connor. The correct approach was indicated by Judge Frankel in Hupart v. Board
of Higher Educ., 420 F. Supp. 1087, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), when he noted: "In light of
the sharp split among legal scholars over the question of the constitutionality of reverse
discrimination, these defendants, if they acted with the requisitesubjective state of mind,
might on that score escape liability." (Emphasis added.) See letter from Bruce J. Ennis,
Esq., to Leon Friedman (Jan. 26, 1977), a copy of which is on file in the office of the
Hofstra Law Review.
108. 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976).
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phone for twenty-one months. The court held that the state of the
law was uncertain with respect to national security wiretaps and
the applicability of Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, which established a civil cause of action
for illegal taps. The uncertainty of the law, however, did not
establish a good faith defense for those who by their actions
showed that they acted in subjective bad faith:
From this factual base, the liability and responsibility of
certain defendants emerges: former President Nixon, for having
initiated and overseen the program without any temporal or
informational limits on the surveillance; Attorney General
Mitchell, for having failed to carry out review and renewal obligations during the entire twenty-one month surveillance period;
H.R. Haldeman, for having reviewed the wiretap material for
over a year without recommending termination and for having
disseminated the material for purposes unrelated to the tap's
original justification.
.[The Court finds under all the circumstances presented that a subjective good faith defense is unavailable."
If the government official has proved his subjective good
faith or sincerity, it is then necessary to determine whether the
official's sincere belief in the legality of what he did was reasonable. Thus it is necessary to reach the "reasonableness" or objective part of the test only if an initial finding of subjective good
faith has been made.
D. The defense of reasonablegood faith is a question of fact
which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
No matter which part of the test is relied upon, the proof of
reasonable good faith is a factual question with the burden of
proof placed on the defendant official. In a recent case in the
Third Circuit, Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State
College,"' the court of appeals en banc laid out the following test
to determine whether a professor was entitled to damages because
he was removed from his position without a pretermination hearing. The court said:
109. Id. at 845 (citations omitted).
110. 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (2d Cir. 1972).
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We therefore hold that in § 1983 actions the burden is on the
defendant official claiming official immunity to come forward
and to convince the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that, under the standards of Wood v. Strickland, official
immunity should attach. On remand the district court must
determine whether the defendants met their burden of establishing (1) that they did not know and reasonably need not have
known that depriving Skehan of a pretermination hearing violated due process, and (2) that they acted without malicious
intention to deprive him of his constitutional rights or cause him
to suffer other injury.'
This approach was followed by the District of Columbia Circuit in its en banc opinion in Zweibon v. Mitchell: "[A] good
faith defense to liability . . will be established if appellees can
demonstrate (1) that they had a subjective good faith belief that
it was constitutional to install warrantless wiretaps under the
circumstances of this case; and (2) that this belief was itself reasonable."'' Further, a district court in Tennessee noted that "in
asserting the defense of good faith it is necessary that the defendants establish that they acted in good faith and with a reasona' 13
ble belief as to the validity of their actions.'
Since reasonable good faith must be proved by the defendant, it is rare that the issue can be determined on a motion for
summary judgment: "[G]ood faith is a question usually reserved
for the fact-finder, so 'even when there is no dispute as to the
facts, it usually is for the jury to decide whether the conduct in
question meets' the reasonable man standard .
"11
'

E. Lack of subjective good faith is not necessarily equivalent to
malice or bad motive.
The Supreme Court's formulation of the good faith defense
111. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 61-62 (3d Cir. 1976).
112. 516 F.2d 594, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
113. Flair v. Cox, 402 F. Supp. 818, 822 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (emphasis added). See
also McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975).
114. Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (D.D.C. 1976). See also Walker v.
Calahan, 542 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976); Kellerman v. Askew, 541 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1976);
Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1976); Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 68 F.R.D.
239 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Sartin v. City of Columbus Util. Comm'n, 421 F. Supp. 393 (N.D.
Miss. 1976): "Whether the Commissioner acted in subjective good faith ... is a question
of fact which must be decided after evidentiary hearing, and it is therefore not a proper
subject for summary judgment." Id. at 399. See also Redman v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766
(1st Cir. 1975). But cf. White v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077 (4th Cir. 1976); Jones v. United
States, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976); Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974).
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began with the subjective element: Was the official "acting sincerely and with a belief that he [was] doing right," i.e., lawfully." ' In some cases lack of good faith has been held to be
equivalent to malice, but such a finding is not necessarily the sole
determinant of liability. In a recent case in the Fifth Circuit, a
college president dismissed three student editors of the college
newspaper because of their poor grammar, spelling and expression. The students sued, claiming a violation of their first amendment rights. The court held that "President Williams cannot
avoid responsibility for his abridgment of First Amendment
rights because his motives were to serve the best interest of the
school."116 The court thus found that although the president had
not acted out of malice he had nevertheless violated the students'
rights and had to pay damages." 7
In another case, Faracav. Clements,"' the plaintiffs were an
interracial couple seeking employment with a state mental center
in Georgia. Although they were highly qualified applicants, the
director of the center refused them employment because he feared
that adverse consequences would result from hiring them. Despite the director's claim that he acted out of a "good faith concern for the program he was administering" and "not out of any
personal bias or prejudice,""' 9 the court found him personally
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court held that there was a
difference between a knowing failure to obey the law in a good
faith fear of the consequences and a good faith belief that it is
legal to take a particular action. "While the latter may constitute
a legitimate defense to a claim by an injured party

. . .

the for-

mer does not."'' 9
In some cases, proof of negligence has been considered sufficient to establish liability in a section 1983 action. Typical are
cases in which a police chief negligently failed to train and supervise police officers under his control, 2 ' a prison official negligently
115. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
116. Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir. 1975).
117. Id.
118. 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1975).
119. Id. at 960.
120. Id. (citations omitted). Although the case involved a suit under § 1981, the court
cited relevant decisions under § 1983, indicating that the proposed test would be the same
for both types of actions.
121. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on othergroundssub nom.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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failed to provide necessary medical attention to inmates'2 2 or to
control guards beating a prisoner,12 and mental health officials
negligently failed to prevent some inmates from beating another
2 41
inmate.'
Each of these cases has one point in common: The negligence
of the official involved might have an ongoing and recurrent effect
upon the lives of other citizens. Although some courts have
phrased the
question in terms of whether the negligence was
"simple,"''2 the crucial question should be whether the official's
actions were likely to have a continuing impact and to injure
other citizens in the same target area. For example, if a prison
official negligently fails to mail one letter to a prisoner's lawyer,
that action may not rise to a section 1983 violation; but if the
official establishes procedures that are likely to lose or delay a
significant amount of prisoner mail, the official should have to
answer in damages to anyone affected. '
The point is illustrated in Bryan v. Jones,'2 a recent en banc
decision in the Fifth Circuit. In that case a sheriff was sued under
section 1983 for false imprisonment because he negligently failed
to investigate whether the plaintiff was being held in jail lawfully.
(The sheriff had kept the plaintiff in jail for a month after the
District Attorney had moved to dismiss all charges.) Under the
common law, the intent to imprison would have been sufficient
to impose liability even if the sheriff thought he had legal authority to detain a prisoner. The Fifth Circuit in Bryan v. Jones held,
however, that to succeed in a section 1983 action a plaintiff must
prove more than the mere intent to imprison required for common
law tort liability. 28 In other words, a good faith defense could
defeat a section 1983 claim even if it would not have barred a
common law false imprisonment claim. Furthermore, the court
agreed that some negligent action by the sheriff might lead to
liability under section 1983. The court explained: "If [the sher122. Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972).
123. Byrd v. Breshke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).
124. Stance v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d
1121 (1st Cir. 1976).
125. Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976)(en banc). See also Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1972).
126. See Navarette v. Enomoto, 536 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub non.
Procunier v. Navarette, 45 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1977).
127. 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976).
128. Id. at 1213-14.
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iff] negligently establishes a record keeping system in which errors of this kind are likely, he will be held liable."'20
This same type of distinction was also recognized by the
Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble.119 In that case the plaintiff,
a prisoner in Texas, injured his back. He received superficial
medical treatment and continued to complain about his pain, but
the authorities insisted that he return to work. After continued
complaints he received medication for irregular cardiac rhythm,
a condition which had not previously been diagnosed. The prisoner then brought a section 1983 action alleging inadequate medical'attention by the prison officials and doctors.
The Supreme Court held that the complaint stated a valid
cause of action under section 1983 against the defendants for
subjecting the plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment. In the
Court's opinion, inadequate medical attention to prisoners may
impose unnecessary pain and suffering on them which is forbidden by the eighth amendment. 31 The Court stated that "a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because
the victim is a prisoner."'3 The Court further noted, however,
that "acts or ommissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"1 33 will lead to a constitutional violation.
In short, whereas a single negligent act is not enough, either
a malicious act or acts evincing deliberate indifference to prisoners' medical needs will result in liability. Negligently establishing
a system in which a prisoner would not receive adequate medical
attention would meet the latter test.
In a recent district court decision,' 34 a prisoner sued a sheriff
because of two homosexual rapes which occurred when he was in
jail. The sheriff was aware that sexual assaults occurred in the
jail, but he did not take proper precautions to prevent them. The
judge charged the jury as follows: "The Court finds that its in129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1215.
45-U.S.L.W. 4023 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976).
Id. at 4024-25.
Id. at 4026-27.
Id. at 4027.
Doe v. Swinson, 20 Cram. L. REP. 2272 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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struction on Woodhous' 35 simple negligence was the proper standard of care as warranted by the evidence." ' The court thus
reasoned that failure to take precautions to prevent homosexual
assaults in the jail after the official was aware that rapes had
occurred there had the potential of affecting others in the jail as
well as the plaintiff. Therefore the sheriff could be held liable.
This approach comports with the basic theory of the reasonable, good faith defense. In the same way that a public official
cannot ignore or disregard "settled, indisputable law, 13 the official cannot act in a way that may negligently override the constitutional rights of the people he is supposed to serve. The underlying rationale of the section 1983 cause of action is the recognition
that government officials, by virtue of their office, have the potential for inflicting great harm on citizens. While on the one
hand, section 1983 should not inhibit the "vigorous, and effective
administration of policies of government," 3 ' public officials
should not be allowed to ignore safeguards affecting the lives and
rights of the people they serve. Single, isolated acts can be excused but negligent acts that have great and widespread potential
for harm cannot be permitted.' 9
135. Woodhous v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. (1973). In
Woodhous a prisoner brought a § 1983 action complaining that he had a right to be
reasonably protected from constant threats of violence and sexual assaults by fellow
inmates. The court held that the prisoner could bring such an action even though he had
not yet been assaulted.
136. Doe v. Swinson, 20 Crim. L. Rep. 2272, 2273 (E.D. Va. 1976).
137. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
138. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
139. In his dissenting opinion in Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 573 (7th Cir. 1976),
Judge Swygert argues that the good faith defense does not apply to negligent action. He
took issue with the majority opinion which claimed:
[Glood faith is nothing but the absence of bad faith, and since an official can
only act in bad faith when he is acting intentionally, a nonintentional act can
never be in bad faith. While it may be true that a nonintentional act cannot be
in bad faith, it is not true that good faith is simply the absence of bad faith.
Good faith requires that "[t]he official himself [is] acting sincerely and with
a belief that he is doing right." Wood, 420 U.S. at 321, 95 S.Ct. at 1000. Such
an affirmative belief is only possible with respect to intentional acts. It is nonsensical to speak of committing a negligent act in good faith. The guards who
left the door to Bonner's cell unlocked could not have done so in good faith
unless they were conscious of what they were doing, a hypothesis inconsistent
with the assumption that they were merely negligent. Since the dichotomy
between good and bad faith is irrelevant to negligent conduct, the majority's
reliance on Wood is inapposite.
Id. at 573.
However, Judge Swygert's opinion goes too far since it would predicate § 1983 liability
upon simple negligence-a conclusion which has been rejected by most of the courts who
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F. Lack of subjective good faith may be inferred from the
circumstances of the case.
From its view of the circumstances surrounding a case, a
court may determine that the defendant did not act in good faith.
4 " that liability under
The Supreme Court held in Monroe v. Pape'
section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."' 41 A court of appeals has recently held
that suits for constitutional violations should incorporate the normal tort rule that "a person intends the natural foreseeable consequences of his actions.'1 2 Thus, the acts of a government official

may lead a court to conclude that he must have known that a
person's constitutional rights were being violated.
Manfredonia v. Barry,' Lykken v. Vavreck'" and Tatum v.
4 5 are recent cases which exemplify the application of this
Morton'
standard. In Manfredonia'two police officers arrested a wellknown lecturer on birth control, William Baird, and one member
of the audience before whom he was speaking for endangering the
welfare of a child.' The police officers who were later sued under
section 1983 for making the arrests claimed that they had "acted
honestly in the belief that Baird's comments about the contraceptive and other devices on his demonstration board made in the
presence of 'teenagers' observed in the audience endangered their
physical, mental or moral welfare."' 47 The court commented:
This, of course, would not justify the arrest of Mrs. Manfredonia, nor of Mr. Baird. She did no lecturing and her baby
daughter could not possibly have comprehended what was said.
There is not a scintilla of evidence that Baird was addressing his
have considered the matter. A more appropriate test is that outlined in the text accompanying notes 130-138 supra. See Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1976) for
a later discussion of this problem.
140. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
141. Id. at 187.
142. United States v. Texas Educ. Agencies, 532 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1976),
vacated sub nom. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 3413
(U.S. Dec. 3, 1976).
143. 401 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
144. 366 F. Supp. 585 (D. Minn. 1973).
145. 402 F. Supp. 719 (D.D.C. 1974).
146. The "child" involved was the infant daughter of an audience member, although
the presence of teenagers during the lecture was cited by the arresting officers as justification for the arrest. Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762, 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
147. Id.
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remarks to "teenagers" or was in any way responsible for their
presence.' 48
The court concluded that the police officers must answer in damages because they had acted in clear disregard of the plaintiffs'
first amendment rights.
In Lykken v. Vavreck, 49 a similar case arising in Minnesota,
two officers arrested a college professor for operating a disorderly
house and for selling liquor without a license. The arrest grew out
of a fund-raising affair in the professor's house held on behalf of
a group called "People Against Missiles," which opposed a proposed antiballistic missile installation in North Dakota. The professor was charging a fifty-cent donation for each glass of beer in
order to raise money in support of the cause. Twenty policemen
entered the house to effect the arrests and seized not only beer
and wine in the professor's house but "virtually every piece of
paper in sight.""'5 The court held the arrests and the seizure of
the papers were a violation of the fourth amendment:
The conclusion is inescapable that the arrests here in question
were improperly motivated, undertaken not in furtherance of
good faith law enforcement but for the purpose of harassing
those at the gathering because of their political beliefs, and the
arrests were thus illegal. The extent of the search of the premises
incident to the arrests plus Tidgwell's inquiry to the F.B.I. concerning the seized papers further indicate that the police were
interested not in good faith law enforcement but in using the
arrests as a pretext for seizing any and all potentially damning
evidence of any possible law violation that might serendipitously be turned up. Accordingly, the court need not reach the
question of the existence vel non of probable cause, since it is
not necessary for the result. The Fourth Amendment protects
the people of this nation against unreasonable searches and seizures. Under all the circumstances the activities of the Minneapolis police at the David Lykken home on the evening of May
9, 1970, were unreasonable, and thus a violation of plaintiffs'
constitutional rights.' 5'
2
Lastly, in Tatum v. Morton,15
another case involving interference with first amendment rights, a police officer in Washing-

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
366 F. Supp. 585 (D. Minn. 1973).
Id. at 590.
Id. at 593.
402 F. Supp. 719 (D.D.C. 1974).
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ton, D.C., arrested a number of individuals who were engaging in
a Quaker prayer vigil near the White House. 5 ' The officer made
the arrests because he feared the influx of outsiders who might
damage property. Ostensibly to prevent such damage, he set up
police lines near the vigil and ordered the demonstrators to disperse. When they refused, he arrested the plaintiffs. The district
court held that the police officer had violated the plaintiffs' first
amendment rights.
More recently, in Halperin v. Kissinger,'54 President Nixon,
Attorney General John Mitchell and other high officials of the
federal government were sued for engaging in a wiretap program
against Morton Halperin, a former member of the National Security Council staff. The evidence showed that the wiretap had been
kept on for twenty-one months although after the first five
months of the tap Halperin was no longer a government employee. The defendants claimed that the wiretap was a good faith
effort to locate leaks of important government information. The
court rejected defendants' good faith defense and, granting summary judgment for the plaintiff against President Nixon, John
Mitchell and H.R. Haldeman, commented:
The evidence reflects a twenty-one month wiretap without fruits
or evidence of wrongdoing, a failure to renew or evaluate the
material obtained, a lack of records and procedural compliance,
a seemingly political motive for the later surveillance and dissemination of reports, and an apparent effort to conceal the
wiretap documents.'
This approach to the problem of good faith has been followed
in other cases involving actions seeking only injunctive relief' 5 or
damages under other federal statutes.15 7 In all these cases the
government officials' claim of sincerity was rejected by the courts
on the basis of objective facts which the courts interpreted as
153. Id. See also Washington Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186

(D.D.C. 1975); Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973).
154. 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976).

155. Id.
156. Dempsey v. McQueeney, 387 F. Supp. 333 (D.R.I. 1975)(injunction granted
against police for harrassing female employees at hotel).
157. See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258
(N.D. Fla. 1976), where a suit was filed under the Sherman Act against hospital staff
doctors for pressuring other doctors not to assist the women's center in providing elective
abortions: "[Tihe evidence adduced thus far on the whole preponderates toward the
inference that the mainspring of the defendants' actions was economic." Id. at 1270.
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showing an intent to deprive the citizen of his constitutional
rights.
G. Lack of subjective good faith can be shown by the failure to
observe proceduralsafeguards.
It has long been the law that an agency's failure to follow its
own rules and regulations may result in a violation of the due
process clause.1"8 In the context of a good faith defense such failure may serve as conclusive evidence of subjective bad faith. The
Halperin"' case is illustrative. On May 5, 1969, Attorney General
John Mitchell wrote a memorandum to J. Edgar Hoover, FBI
Director, informing him of new procedures to be followed in national security wiretaps. The new procedures required detailed
justifications before wiretaps would be installed, close supervision of the taps, a ninety-day renewal requirement and detailed
recordkeeping. On May 9, 1969, less than a week after the memorandum was written, a national security wiretap was installed on
Mr. Halperin's telephone in which practically none of these procedures was followed. The failure to follow his own established
procedures was one reason for the finding of subjective bad faith
on the part of Mr. Mitchell. 10
Hupart v. Board of Higher Education' is also illustrative. In
Hupart members of the Board of Higher Education of New York
City were sued for damages because they engaged in "reverse
discrimination" by excluding qualified white males from the city
college's biomedical program in favor of minority group students.
The evidence established that racial factors were intentionally
employed in the selection of applicants and that white majority
candidates were deliberately excluded from consideration. The
court held that individual board members who were responsible
for the race-conscious policy would have to answer in damages to
the persons injured even though the legality of reverse discrimination was still uncertain at the time. In this case the Board violated its own established policy against using race as an admissions criterion:
[Tihere was another constitutional violation here-the depar158. Accardi v. Shaugnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). See Note, Violations By Agencies
of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARv. L. REv. 629 (1974).
159. Halperin v. Kissinger, 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976).
160. Id. at 844-45.
161. 420 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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ture from the Board's own policy against using race as an admissions criterion. Any defendant who knew, or should have known,
of this policy and deliberately departed therefrom would seemingly be liable, irrespective of whether he thought he was doing
the right or "fair" thing.' 2
In an analogous case decided by the Second Circuit,' a prisoner sued the warden of Clinton Prison for segregating him in a
"strip cell" and forcing him to sleep nude on a concrete floor for
twenty-one days without bedding of any kind. The warden
claimed he should not be personally liable for damages because
he did not personally impose the punishment at issue. The court
approved the award of $1,500 damages against the warden, not
only because he must have had knowledge of the existence of the
strip cells but because he failed to follow existing law on the
procedures for imposing discipline in the prison. Under established state law the warden was required to keep a daily record
of the proceedings of the prison including every punishment inflicted on a prisoner and every charge of cruel and unjust treatment by a guard.'
H. Lack of subjective good faith may be inferred from inaction
and from failure to act.
In Downie v. Powers,115 a group of Jehovah's Witnesses were
attacked by a mob, and police officers, though aware of threats
of violence, did nothing to prevent the formation of the mob or
to restore order after violence erupted. Holding that a new trial
was necessary, the court stated: "One charged with the duty of
keeping the peace cannot be an innocent bystander where the
constitutionally protected rights of persons are being invaded. He
must stand on the side of the law and order or be counted among
the mob."' 65
This principle has been followed in a series of recent cases
dealing with control of police officers by their superiors. In Sims
v. Adams, "7 the plaintiff sued a police officer for false arrest and
assault; included also as defendants were the mayor of the city,
the chief of police and other supervisory personnel. The com162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 1108.
Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 136. See also Seals v. Nicholl, 378 F. Supp. 172, 175 (N.D. IlM.1973).
193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951).
Id. at 764.
537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss3/2

28

Friedman: The Good Faith Defense in Constitutional Litigation

Good Faith Defense
plaint alleged that the superiors knew of the violent tendencies
of the police officer and failed to control him. Despite these allegations, the district court dismissed the superiors from the case.
The court of appeals reversed: "Sims' complaint states a cause
of action against defendants Massell and Jenkins because they
allegedly breached the duties of a mayor and a chief of police to
control a policeman's known propensity for improper use of
force." 6 8
Similar results have occurred in cases dealing with a jailer's
indifference to the punishment of prisoners under his care. In a
case involving the beating of a prisoner by an arresting officer, the
Fifth Circuit held that the jailer who stood by while the beating
occurred and did not obtain medical attention for the prisoner
was answerable in damages.'69 The court explained its holding:
It is well established that a warden's deliberate indifference to
an inmate's severe and obvious injuries is tantamount to an
intentional infliction of cruel and unusual punishment ....
It
has also been held that a supervisory officer is liable under §
1983 if he refuses to intervene where his subordinates are beating an inmate in his presence. . . . Here the jury verdict against
Chanclor establishes that the plaintiff was in fact viciously
beaten in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Moore's
admission that this occurred in his presence, without objection
or intervention, and that he thereafter made no effort to obtain
medical assistance established as a matter of law the necessary
70
intent under the rationale of these cases.
This approach is in conformity with the general tort principle
that a person may be held liable for his omissions or inactions if
he is under some affirmative duty to act and he fails to act accordingly.7
L

Government officials relying upon an objective good faith

168. Id. at 832.
169. Harris v. Chanclor, 537 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d
33 (6th Cir. 1973), where the court stated:
[A] law enforcement officer can be liable under § 1983 when by his inaction
he fails to perform a statutorily imposed duty to enforce the laws equally and
fairly, and thereby denies equal protection to persons legitimately exercising
rights guaranteed them under state or federal law. Acts of omission are actionable in this context to the same extent as are acts of commission.
Id. at 36-37.
170. Harris v. Chanclor, 537 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1976)(citations omitted).
171. See Symkowski v. Miller, 294 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Huey v.
Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864, 872 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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defense must be able to point to an open, affirmative legal
command or judicial decision as the basis for their actions.
Even if a defendant proves his sincerity and belief that his
actions were lawful, he is not fully exonerated from liability; the
defendant must still prove that this belief was reasonable. This
part of the Wood v. Strickland
test has been called the "objective
12
good faith defense.1
In order to prevail on the second part of the test, a defendant
must prove that he was acting in conformity with an openly declared legal command. For example, a police officer who executes
a search warrant in good faith fulfills this part of the test.7 3 Similarly, if a court has ordered the officer to take certain action, he
would generally be deemed to have had a good faith belief that
it was lawful for him to take that action.
If a court did not order the particular action, but state law
authorized it, a government official can ordinarily rely on the
statute to support a good faith defense. In the leading case on the
subject, Pierson v. Ray,' three police officer defendants were
sued under section 1983 for arresting the plaintiffs under a disorderly conduct law which was held unconstitutional four years
after the arrests in question. In Pierson the Supreme Court held
that an officer was not "charged with predicting the future course
of constitutional law,"' 17 5 and could act "under a statute that he
reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional."'
Later, in O'Connorv. Donaldson," the Supreme Court again
cited a reliance on state law as a crucial factor in determining
objective good faith. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the court of appeals' decision affirming the judgment against
O'Connor because the court of appeals had not considered
"whether it was error for the trial judge to refuse the additional
instruction concerning O'Connor's claimed reliance on state law
as authorization for Donaldson's continued confinement."'' 7
There may be some situations, however, in which a govern172. See, e.g., Halperin v. Kissinger, 424 F. Supp. 838, 845 (D.D.C. 1976).
173. See Smith v. Martin, 542 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1976); Stadium Films, Inc. v.
Baillargeon, 542 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1976).
174. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
175. Id. at 557.
176. Id. at 555.
177. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
178. Id. at 577.
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ment official may not properly rely on a particular provision of
state law.'79 For example, if the same or similar law has been
declared unconstitutional in some other jurisdiction, or if because
of developing constitutional doctrine it may be foreseeable that
the law is not valid, then a reasonable public official should realize that the law should no longer be invoked. Further, as noted
below,' a government official may reveal a lack of subjective
good faith in relying upon the law. In almost all other situations,
though, a reliance upon state law as authorizing the action under
attack would immunize the official involved.
A public official need not rely only upon an explicit statute
to legitimate his actions; a judicial decision may justify the actions and also insulate the official from damages. In Laverne v.
Corning,'"" various officials of the town of Laurel Hollow, New
York, were sued for entering the grounds of an artist's estate
without a warrant. They claimed that they were inspecting the
estate for evidence of a zoning law violation. The New York Court
of Appeals found the entry illegal and reversed a criminal conviction based upon evidence found during the unauthorized inspection.8 The artist then sued the officials involved for damages,
claiming a violation of the fourth amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that at the time the entry occurred, Supreme Court precedents, including Frank v.
Maryland,13 justified administrative entries without a search
warrant. It was only after the entry occurred, the court noted,'8 4
that the Supreme Court decided Camara v. Municipal Court,'85
which overruled the Frank case and declared administrative
searches subject to the warrant requirements of the fourth
amendment. Under such circumstances, according to the Laverne
court, 88 in 1962 the city officials could reasonably have relied
upon the Frank case and therefore they were immune from damages.
In the same fashion, reliance upon administrative regulations or even upon an openly declared administrative practice not
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See, e.g., text accompanying notes 192-194 & 219-221 infra.
See text accompanying notes 190-224 infra.
522 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1975).
People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964).
359 U.S. 360 (1959).
Laverne v. Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1150 (2d Cir. 1975).
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Laverne v. Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1150-51 (2d Cir. 1975).
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embodied in regulations could serve as evidence of objective good
1 Government officials, though, must base their actions on
faith. 87
established, "open" law. If officials act secretly over a long period
of time to violate the constitutional rights of citizens, they cannot
be allowed to rely on the undisturbed "administrative practice"
as the basis for an objective good faith defense. Secrecy is itself a
sign of questionable legality. If an administrative practice is kept
secret, there is no opportunity for public discussion or debate
about it. More importantly, there is no chance for the political
process to overturn a practice if no one is aware of its existence.
It would thus be unthinkable, for example, for an FBI agent
to claim that the long practice of "black-bag" jobs (burglaries)
engaged in by FBI agents for about twenty years insulated them
from any Bivens-type action. Even if they were ordered to commit
the burglaries and the practice had gone on for years, the agents
should not escape liability. While it is possible that reliance upon
some Presidential Executive Order or command could serve also
as the basis of a good faith belief, it must, at the very least, be
as clear, open and unequivocal as a statutory command would be.
J. A government official is charged with knowledge of
foreseeable constitutionaldevelopments.
Although the Supreme Court noted in Piersonv. Ray' 8 that
an officer is not "charged with predicting the future course of
constitutional law," the Court added an important qualification
in O'Connor v. Donaldson'89 when it said that an officer is not
charged with anticipating "unforeseeable constitutional developments." 111
In other words, where an explicit state law serves as the
basis for an officer's action, as in Pierson,the officer does not have
to anticipate that the law may be declared invalid. Similarly,
when an officer relies upon an explicit Supreme Court decision,
he does not have to anticipate that the Supreme Court may overrule that decision. The officer is, however, chargeable when later
judicial decisions do not alter or change the state of the law which
existed when he acted, but only clarify or make more explicit
what the law was at the time.
An early Supreme Court example of this principle is Lane v.
187. See, e.g., Mukmuk v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Correctional Servs., 529 F.2d
272 (2d Cir. 1976).
188. 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
189. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
190. Id. at 577 (emphasis added) (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322
(1975)).
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533

Wilson. 9 , In that case the plaintiff, a black citizen of Oklahoma,
sued certain state election officials for damages under section
1983 for failure to register him as a voter. The officials relied upon
a state law that was passed after the Oklahoma "grandfather
clause" had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Guinn v. United States.'92 The earlier law prohibited
anyone from registering to vote unless his grandfather had previously voted-a transparent attempt to deprive blacks of the
right to vote since their grandfathers at the time had been slaves.
After this law was invalidated in 1915, Oklahoma passed a new
law permitting people to register as voters if they had voted in
1914 (before the Guinn case had been decided) or if they had
registered during a special registration period between April 30,
1916, and May 11, 1916.'11 In other words, an eligible black citizen
who had been barred from voting by the grandfather clause had
only twelve days to register or he would be forever barred from
voting. The Supreme Court found the new law a clear violation
of the fifteenth amendment and an obvious ruse to reestablish the
' Although the second Oklahoma
discredited grandfather clause. 94
law had never been declared unconstitutional, the Supreme
Court reversed a judgment in the defendants' favor and remanded the case.
There are more recent cases which take the same approach.
In Slate v. McFetridge,'9 5 the plaintiffs sued several Chicago city
officials under section 1983 for damages because the officials had
refused to process a request for a permit to hold a demonstration
in one of the city parks during the 1968 Democratic National
Convention. The request was made early in July but the defendants refused to process or act on it until it was too late to hold
the rally. The Chicago ordinance governing the issuance of permits gave city officials wide discretion on the matter and did not
require any kind of prompt notice to applicants concerning the
disposition of the permit application. The court of appeals examined the state of the law at the time the application was made,
paying particular attention to Freedman v. Maryland,'9 ' a 1965
case which required swift administrative review of requests to
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

307 U.S. 268 (1939).
238 U.S. 347 (1915).
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 271 (1939).
Id. at 275.
484 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1973).
380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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exercise first amendment rights. The court in Slate observed that
the Chicago ordinance had not been declared unconstitutional
and noted that "a man [should] not be held liable in damages
for actions or omissions which he could not or should not be
' The defenexpected to have known would cause his liability."197
dants argued that Freedman involved censorship of movies and
that it was therefore not relevant to the delayed denial of a park
permit. The court of appeals nevertheless found the defendants
liable for damages: "[D]efendants had notice by Freedman that
their prompt resolution of [plaintiff] Slate's permit request was
a dictate of due process in the protection of First Amendment
rights."'
In a similar case, Seals v. Nicholl,'9 an individual sued members of the Chicago police for seizing, impounding and destroying
his car. The plaintiff had been arrested in a private parking lot
on suspicion of larceny and was unable to raise bail. The police
towed his car away from the private parking lot. Under the procedures in force at the time of the arrest, notice was sent to the
prisoner's home address advising him that his car had been impounded and that he had fifteen days in which to reclaim it. The
towing report clearly labelled the car as "prisoner property."20
The prisoner was discharged after nineteen days. He never received the notice about the car when he was in jail and the car
was destroyed by the police in the interim. While the procedure
at issue was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hanrahan,1 1the defendants in Seals
argued that they had had a good faith belief that the procedure
was adequate at the time the car had been towed away. The court
rejected defendants' contention on the ground that Robinson did
not establish "any new or more severe standard for due process"
and merely "involved the application of existing constitutional
law."' z "Thus," according to the court, "even if defendants...
did rely on statutory provisions to provide less than actual notice
197. Slate v. McFetridge, 484 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir. 1973).
198. Id. at 1176. See also Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282 (D.D.C. 1976), where

the court stated: "The clear implication of Pierson is that an officer can be held liable
when acting under a statute which has not been declared unconstitutional, if it is found
that he or she should have anticipated that the statute could not pass constitutional
muster."
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 1296 (footnote omitted).
378 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. 111. 1973).
Id. at 174.
409 U.S. 38 (1972).
Seals v. Nicholl, 378 F. Supp. 172, 178 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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to plaintiff, such action does not constitute justification in circumstances such as those involved in this case'2°3and cannot, therefore, form the basis of a good faith defense.

A number of similar cases have arisen in relation to prison
discipline and in each case it became necessary to examine the
state of the law at the time that the acts in question occurred to
determine whether a good faith defense would succeed. In the
Mukmuk case 24 the warden was accused of taking certain literature from the plaintiff and punishing him for its possession. The
events at issue took place in 1967. In 1964, however, the Second
Circuit had held that punishing prisoners for the possession of
religious literature violated the first amendment. According to
the court, therefore, the warden in Mukmuk "had received sufficient warning from the courts by 1967 that it was unconstitutional to impose punishment for its possession. If it was, indeed,
religious literature, the warden may be liable in damages, assuming that a sufficient personal responsibility is shown."2 °5 Similarly, in Johnson v. Anderson,2°1a warden sent certain prisoners
to solitary confinement without giving them a chance to be heard
in their own defense when, nine months earlier, the Third Circuit
had held that such a course was improper. The Johnson court
concluded that the warden "failed to establish an official immunity defense with respect to this portion of plaintiff's due process
claim" inasmuch as "a reasonable man in [his] position would
have sought legal counsel from the Attorney General's office concerning plaintiffs' procedural rights. If he had sought such advice,
' 27
he clearly would not have followed the course which he chose.
In still another case, Knell v. Bensinger,2°5 the plaintiff had
been put in isolation in prison for fifteen days. He asked for
certain law books which were denied him on the basis of a prison
regulation which denied reading materials to all inmates in soli203. Id.
204. Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Dep't of Correctional Servs., 529 F.2d 272 (2d Cir.
1976).
205. Id. at 275.
206. 420 F. Supp. 845 (D. Del. 1976).
207. Id. at 850. See also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d
569 (7th Cir. 1975). In Hostrop members of the school board were charged with knowledge
that they could not dismiss a faculty member for exercising protected first amendment
rights since Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), had been decided before the
dismissal in July 1970. However, they were not required to know that they had to grant a
teacher a due process hearing inasmuch as Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
establishing that constitutional principle, was decided after the dismissal.
208. 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975).
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tary confinement. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
noted that "there existed a well established principle that the
state could not absolutely deny inmates incarcerated in its prisons a reasonable and effective right of access to the courts to
challenge their confinement .
."I" Since the deprivation involved was only for fifteen days, however, the court decided that
the warden could have had a reasonable good faith belief in the
legality of a temporary denial of access." '
Similar results have occurred in other areas. In Morales v.
Hamilton,21' for example, a border guard was sued for stopping a
car on an Arizona state highway without probable cause while
looking for illegal aliens. The stop occurred on June 4, 1973, a few
weeks before the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 21 2 which declared roving border searches unconstitutional. The Morales court said that numerous court decisions
had permitted roving automobile searches in border regions before Almeida-Sanchez and therefore the guard acted reasonably
in relying upon the prior law.21 3
Further, in Picha v. Wielgos,1 1 three students were searched
by school officials who were looking for drugs after the police had
been alerted. The court held that by November 1973 when the
search occurred, it was widely known that the courts would not
permit any invasion of privacy if fourth amendment standards of
reasonableness were not met "unless that intrusion was reasonably justified in terms of the school's legitimate interests." ' In the
court's opinion: "School officials cannot claim immunity when
they violate the well settled rights of their students." '
Sometimes it is necessary to make an elaborate analysis of
the state of the law to determine if similar laws have been under
judicial attack. In Fosterv. Zeeko,2 7 two police officers were sued
*.".

209. Id. at 726.
210. Id. at 726-27.
211. 391 F. Supp. 85 (D. Ariz. 1975).
212. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
213. Morales v. Hamilton, 391 F. Supp. 85 (D. Ariz. 1975). See also Hupart v. Board
of Higher Educ., 420 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), where the court stated: "In light of
the sharp split among legal scholars over the question of the constitutionality of reverse
discrimination, these defendants, if they acted with the requisite subjective state of mind,
might on that score escape liability." Id. at 1108.
214. 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
215. Id. at 1220.
216. Id. See also Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976).
217. 540 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1976).
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for false arrest. In December 1971 they had arrested the plaintiffs
who were found in an apartment where marijuana was allegedly
present. Charged with violating a Chicago "disorderly house"
ordinance, the plaintiffs argued that by 1971 various decisions
had made it clear that ordinances of the type involved were invalid for reasons of vagueness and overbreadth. 18 In fact, another
section of the same ordinance had been previously declared un21
constitutional by a district court and that decision was final. 1
The court of appeals in Fosterexamined similar provisions under
Illinois law to determine how they had fared in the courts. It also
looked into the relevant Supreme Court decisions and found that
the key case of Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,2 0 holding
broad vagrancy laws unconstitutional, had not been decided until
February 1972, three months after the arrests. It then looked into
the history of "disorderly house" statutes and concluded that
there was enough uncertainty about the law to justify a reversal
22
of a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. '
22
2
In Zweibon v. Mitchell, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that warrantless wiretaps for national security purposes were in violation of the fourth amendment.
Whether the officials responsible for the wiretapping had to answer in damages was to be determined at a later hearing. The
court of appeals "decline[d] to express any views as to the reasonableness of any belief that warrantless wiretapping under the
circumstances of this case was constitutional, at least until the
trial judge determine[d] that appellees did in fact have such a
belief. ' 23 The court directed the trial court to consider "judicial
precedent. . . presidential practice. . . and congressional legislation" in determining the good faith of the officials involved. 24
K. That government officials are ordered to violate a person's
constitutionalrights cannot serve as the basis of an objective good
faith defense.
It is a fundamental principle of the common law that one
who obeys an illegal order is equally liable as the person giving
218.
219.
F.2d 551
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 1313.
See Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Ill.
1968), appeal dismissed, 410
(7th Cir. 1969).
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
Foster v. Zeeko, 540 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir. 1976).
516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 671 n.274.
Id.
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2 In short, orders from superiors are not per se the
the order.1

equivalent of statutory commands permitting an official to invoke the objective good faith defense.
This principle is illustrated in a recent case in the Sixth
Circuit. In Glasson v. City of Louisville,2 1 the plaintiff sued a
police officer for grabbing an anti-Nixon poster from her during
a presidential motorcade in Louisville, Kentucky, in 1970. The
Chief of Police had issued orders to all police officers to confiscate
"any sign or poster that was 'detrimental' or 'injurious' to the
President. '22 The police officer had been directed by his immediate superior to grab the plaintiff's poster. Despite the fact that
his actions had been directed by two superiors, the officer who
removed the poster was held liable for violating the first amendment rights of the plaintiff. The court was not convinced that the
destruction was done "in good faith" inasmuch as "[tihe actions
of [the officers] were the result of an official determination not
to permit dissent and of their failure to accord to appellant the
'228
right to engage in activity protected by the First Amendment.
L. Reliance upon the advice of counsel may provide the basisfor
an objective good faith defense.
In Schiff v. Williams,129 the Fifth Circuit held a college professor liable for firing three student editors of a school newspaper
because he did not like what they were publishing. The court said
that the president's belief that he had the right to fire the students stated no defense to a section 1983 action since "it appears
clear that he should have known better and would have had he
sought legal advice. ' 23 0 Similarly, a district court in Delaware
held that "a reasonable man in [the prison warden's] position
would have sought legal counsel from the Attorney General's office concerning plaintiff's procedural rights. If he had sought such
advice, he clearly would not have followed the course which he
chose." '' From these cases it can be inferred that if a government
225. See Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 132 (1851); Axtell's Case, 84
Eng. Rep. 1060 (1660). Although these cases involved criminal liability, the principles
discussed apply to suits for damages as well as to suits brought under well-accepted tort
principles. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON ThE LAW OF ToRTs, ch. 12, § 70 (4th ed. 1971).
226. 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975).
227. Id. at 901.
228. Id. at 910-11.
229. 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975).
230. Id. at 263 (Gee, J., concurring).
231. Johnson v. Anderson, 420 F. Supp. 845, 850 (D. Del. 1976).
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official seeks legal advice and follows it, an objective good faith
defense will succeed because the court will be satisfied that the
official reasonably believed that he was acting lawfully.
While this principle is expressed in certain cases, there are
limits to its application. In Adler v. Lynch,2 32 a case exemplifying

the principle, the plaintiff purchased land to be used for a personal residence and a dog kennel. According to the plaintiff, at
the time she purchased the land she was unaware that it was
zoned exclusively for single residences. When she was notified by
the County Permits and Inspection Department that the kennel
was in violation of the zoning laws and was ordered to remove the
kennel, she requested a variance from the County Planning Commission. The Board of Commissioners denied her request but
gave her one year within which to terminate the operation of the
kennel. Subsequently, the deputy county attorney told the Board
that it had exceeded its authority in granting the plaintiff the
one-year extension for the kennel. The deputy county attorney
then wrote to plaintiff advising her that she had only ninety days
within which to discontinue the kennel. When she failed to act
by the specified date, the Board held a meeting (without sending
individual notice of the meeting to plaintiff) and instructed the
county attorney to take legal action against her. The plaintiff was
arrested for violating the zoning laws but all charges were ultimately dropped. Eventually the woman sued members of the
Board for violating her due process rights by not giving her notice
of the final meeting and by voting to take action against her after
they had told her she could keep the kennel for a year. The court
held that even though proper notice should have been given, the
commissioners were not liable for damages:
The Court does not interpret Wood to stand for the proposition that it is not good faith for an official to accept erroneous
advice from his appointed counsel on a question of law of sufficient complexity to justify a resort to expert legal guidance, at
least, when the advice which is forthcoming is not patently unreasonable .... 2
The court explained that
[t]o hold otherwise, and predicate personal liability upon the
defendants['] dependency upon expert legal counsel would se232. 415 F. Supp. 705 (D. Neb. 1976).
233. Id. at 714 (footnote omitted).
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riously and substantially undermine the very purposes for which
the doctrine of official immunity was developed. The principal
effect of such a holding would be to make public officials-who
are often not themselves attorneys-skeptical of apparently reasonable advice from qualified counsel, uncertain of their personal wellbeing in the exercise of their official discretion whenever the matter at hand was beyond their personal level of legal
sophistication, and ultimately timid in their administration of
the law, especially in the enforcement of the ill-defined outer
limits of most public policies.2 4
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association 5 illustrates the limits on the application of the principle. In Tillman
the plaintiffs had brought an action under sections 1981 and 1982
against the directors of a nonprofit corporation, who had excluded
them from a community swimming pool association because of
their race. The Supreme Court held that the association was not
a private club and that the association's racially discriminatory
policy violated section 1982.231 On remand, the court of appeals
assessed damages against the directors of the corporation even
though they had relied on advice of counsel when they excluded
the black applicants from membership.237 With respect to advice
of counsel the court said:
The claim that a corporate officer may violate §§ 1981 and 1982
with impunity because he exercised due diligence by relying on
advice of counsel about the meaning of the law is designed to
severely restrict the application of these statutes. Judicial approval of this claim is warranted by neither precedent nor policy. . . . The Wheaton-Haven directors knew all the relevant
facts, and they fully intended to exclude all persons who could
not qualify under their white-only policy. Their ignorance of the
law though engendered by lawyers' advice and corroborated by
lower federal courts, is no defense."'
More recently, in Halperin v. Kissinger,291 two of the defendants, President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman, relied upon the advice of John Mitchell, then Attorney General, that it was legal to
install warrantless wiretaps. This reliance did not insulate them
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
410 U.S. 431 (1973).
Id. at 438.
517 F.2d 1141, 1143 (4th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1145-46 (citations omitted).
424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976).
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from liability; they were high government officials who should
have known better and their actions demonstrated that they
lacked subjective good faith in what they did.
M. A mistake of law provides no basis for an objective good faith
defense.
The Supreme Court commented in Wood v. Strickland that
an act violating a student's constitutional rights cannot be
"justified by ignorance or disregard of settled indisputable
law.""24 Thus the objective good faith defense depends upon a
reasonable belief in the legality of the official's action. It is clearly
unreasonable for a government official to be ignorant of or mistaken about the law. Thus, although a mistake of fact may exonerate an official if the mistake was reasonable, a mistake of law
cannot generally provide such a defense.
This distinction is illustrated in Lucero v. Donovan, 4' 1 a case
decided by the Ninth Circuit. In Lucero two police officers
stopped a male Mexican on the street who appeared to be under
the influence of narcotics. They asked him where he lived and
whether they could search his residence. He consented to the
search. He took the police to one sister's apartment where they
were informed that her brother did not live there. They then went
to the apartment of another sister. When the police began to
search the second apartment they discovered a woman-the
plaintiff Mrs. Lucero-bathing her two small children. She told
the police that it was her apartment and that her brother was only
a guest. She then demanded to see a search warrant. The police
promptly arrested her and seized certain vitamin tablets under
the mistaken belief that they were drugs. The plaintiff was forcibly undressed and searched at the police station by two policewomen. She subsequently brought a section 1983 action against
the two arresting officers and the two policewomen who searched
her.
The district court directed a verdict for the defendant officers
but the court of appeals reversed, stating that the issue of good
faith was for a jury to decide.242 As the court framed the question,
whether the police officers seized the pills unlawfully depends
240. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
241. 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965). For the general problem of mistake of law as a defense to a § 1983 action, see Theis, supranote 54.
242. Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 22 (9th Cir. 1965).
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only on whether the plaintiff's protest to the police came before
or after the seizure. 2 3 A jury might conclude that the police had
reasonably relied on the consent of her brother, although the facts
in this case made that extremely unlikely. Even if they could
have relied on the original consent, however, the plaintiff's protest vitiated that consent as a matter of law and, from that moment, the police could no longer reasonably believe in their right
to continue to search the apartment.24 4
This distinction is similar to the one long existing in the
criminal law between mistake of law and mistake of fact. If a wife
mistakenly believes that a burglar is climbing into her home and
shoots him, only to discover that the burglar is her husband, she
has committed no crime. The mistake of fact would be a complete
defense since she lacked the necessary criminal intent. On the
other hand, if she shoots a fleeing person, mistakenly thinking
an unarmed
that the law permits her to use deadly force2 against
45
trespasser, her mistake of law is no defense.
The problem has recently arisen in criminal trials relating to
the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. 25 Two
Cuban-Americans were enlisted by E. Howard Hunt to break into
the office of Dr. Louis Fielding to look for Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric file. They were told by Hunt that the break-in was a top
secret national security mission authorized by the White House
and that he had legal authority to authorize the search for the
records. The Cuban-Americans were indicted and tried under 18
U.S.C. § 241 for conspiring to interfere with Dr. Fielding's fourth
amendment rights. The trial judge rejected an instruction that
the defendants' mistake of law as to Hunt's authority could serve
as a defense to the charges. The court of appeals reversed the
conviction. One judge (Judge Wilkey) would permit a broad mistake of law defense similar to a mistake of fact defense. 247 The
concurring judge (Judge Merhige) limited the defense to that
authorized by the Model Penal Code:
The introduction of an "official" source for an individual's reliance on a mistaken concept of the law in acting "illegally" significantly diminishes the strength of the policy foundations supporting the general rule on mistake of law, and adds policy
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
See United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Id.; United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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considerations of grave import that would favor an opposite result. In my view, the defense is available if, and only if, an
individual (1) reasonably, on the basis of an objective standard,
(2) relies on a (3) conclusion or statement of law (4) issued by
an official charged with interpretation, administration, and/or
enforcement responsibilities in the relevant legal field. The first
three issues are of course of a factual nature that may be submitted to a jury; the fourth is a question of law as it deals with
interpretations of the parameters of legal authority. 4
He concluded:
Applying the defense to the facts of this case, the record
discloses sufficient evidence of reliance on an official interpretation of the law for the matter to have been submitted to the jury.
Barker and Martinez assert that they relied on Hunt's authority
as delegated from an intelligence superstructure controlled by
the White House, and firmly believed that they were acting in
a legal capacity. The Executive Branch of the United States
Government is vested with substantive responsibilities in the
field of national security, and decisions of its officials on the
extent of their legal authority deserve some deference from the
public. A jury may well find that John Ehrlichman, then Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, expressed or implied
that the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office was legal under a national security rationale, and that Hunt, as an executive official
in a go-between capacity, passed the position on to the defendants, which they, acting as reasonable men, relied upon in
249
performing the break-in.
A third judge (Judge Leventhal) dissented from the reversal,
claiming that the mistake of law defense was stretched far beyond

its limits.2 0

For purposes of determining liability in civil, as opposed to
criminal, litigation the ALI formulation is too broad. As noted
above, a malicious intent is not necessary to a section 1983
claim-if a mistake of law leads to the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the good faith defense cannot be invoked.2' A police officer or other government official has sufficient protection from tort liability if the law is sufficiently unsettled so that he could reasonably believe in the legality of his acts.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 955.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 963-69.
See text accompanying notes 240-249 supra.
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Just as citizens cannot plead ignorance of the law, however, as a
basis for escaping criminal liability, government officials should
not be permitted to rely upon ignorance of the law which it is their
duty to enforce.
V.

CONCLUSION

An action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on the
assumption that those public officials who violate the constitutional rights of the citizens they are serving must answer in damages for their actions. Officials defending such suits will generally
attempt to invoke absolute immunity or, if such a defense is
unavailable, they will try to justify their actions on the theory
that they were taken in good faith. Absolute immunity for executive department officials, however, has no place in section 1983
actions.25 2 Furthermore, to establish broad rules of immunity
through judicial interpretation is to undercut the purpose of section 1983 and of federal causes of action brought directly under
the Constitution.
Generally, the same rules governing liability for analogous
torts under the common law should apply in section 1983 actions;
a finding of malice or subjective bad faith is always a basis for
liability and these may be inferred from the circumstances of
each case. In addition, negligent courses of action that have the
potential for widespread injury should also result in liability.
It is clear that public officials are bound to follow the law
they are paid to enforce. The rapid constitutional developments
of the past fifteen years have created problems for officials who
must take account of the new protections for citizens. It is not
asking too much of these officials, however, that they become
acquainted with the new constitutional cases and the implications for the conduct of their offices. If they remain ignorant of
what the law means with respect to their treatment of fellow
citizens, a strong dose of tort liability may be the best medicine
to insure that all officials obey the law.
252. See notes 33-70 supra and accompanying text.
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